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Parties
All parties are listed in the caption.
The caption on the pleadings in the district court
contains a reference to "employees"; however, these individuals
did not enter an appearance and are not parties to this
action.

These employees assigned their wages to the Industrial

Commission and the Industrial Commission should be, and is, the
sole appellant.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is a 11 owner-developer of ] and , who coi 11racted

I,

with a builder for the construction of an improvement on his
land, liable, under Section 34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986, for
the wages of tl xe bui 1 der "*' s eixipl oyees if t h e 1:: i ill der d i d n o t p a y
the wages?
II.

Does an appellant from an Industrial Commission

order, pursuant tc Secti on 34-28-9 ( 3 ) , U1 .al Cc >de 1985-1986,
need to file the $100.00 cost bond described in Rule 73(k)
U.R.C.P. to perfect the appeal?
DISPOSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section 34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986:
Whenever any person shall contract with
another for the performance of work,
then it shall be the duty of such
person to provide in the contract that
all wages earned pursuant to the
contract shall be paid in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter,
and in the event that any wages earned
under the contract shall not be paid as
required in this act, such person shall
be civilly liable for all wages for
work performed under such contract in
the same manner as if the employees
entitled to such wages were directly
employed by such person.
Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P.:
At the time of filing the notice of
appeal, the appellant shall file with
such notice a bond for costs on appeal
in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 73(c), except that the amount of
such bond shall be $100.00. The
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appellant may likewise, under the
conditions of Rule 62 and in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 73,
relating to appeals to the Supreme
Court, obtain a stay of execution
pending an appeal, provided, that any
exception to the appellant's sureties
shall be made in the district court to
which the appeal is taken and
justification of such sureties shall be
before the clerk or a judge of such
court.
Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P.:
These rules shall apply to the practice
and procedure in appealing from or
obtaining a r€>view of any order, ruling
or other action of an administrative
board or agency, except in so far as
the specific statutory procedure in
connection with any such appeal or
review is in conflict or inconsistent
with these Rules,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an action to collect unpaid wages.
B.

Previous Proceedings

This case originated when several laborers, who had
worked on a condominium project at Deer Valley, went to the
Industrial Commission and complained that they had not been
paid their wages.

The Industrial Commission held

administrative hearings and, in three separate orders, found in
favor of the employees and against both the employer, T & K
Steel, Inc., and the land own€>r-developer, RDG.
RDG attempted to appeal the orders of the Industrial
Commission to the district court by filing notices of appeal
and petitions for trial de novo (R. 2-11).
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In the district court, the Industrial Commission filed
answers (R

52-53A) , nioti 01 is (R. 54-55 ) to dismiss the appeals

for failure to file cost bonds, and motions (R 12-51) for
partial summary judgment.
summary

judgment

RDG filed motions (R. 75-76) for

Tin- Hiree cases were consolidated into one

case, district court number C85-848, and all references to the
record (R.) are to that case.
The di stri ct co 1 11: t judge granted RDG's Motion For
Summary Judgment and denied the Industrial Commission's Motion
to Dismiss and its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.
(

-

- ).

Statement of Relevant Facts
The respondent, RDG, is a limited partnership.
purpose of tb~- - - > \ner\ship i:.-. stated

s

<

The

\rtificate of

limited partnership filed with the Salt Lake County Clerk
(R. 86-94):
The purpose of the Partnership and the
character of its business is to
acquire, hold, develop, operate, and
manage certain real property
(hereinafter the "Property") situated
in Park City, Summit County, State of
Utah, and more particularly described
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by
this reference made a part hereof."
(R. 8 7 ) . Emphasis added.
RDG entered

into a written contract (R. 16-51) with a

building contractor, T & K Steel, Inc., to construct 27
condomi n 3

units knowi 1 as Phase

il or The Pinnacle at Deer

Valley (R. . «• ) on RDG's land for $5,179,341.00

(R. 1 7 ) .

T & K Steel, Inc. commenced construction, however,
before:: • completion of the project, RDG and T & K Steel, Inc.
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entered into another written agreement terminating their
contractual relationship.

(R. 3 paragraph 3 ) . But while RDG

and T & K Steel, Inc. had settled the dispute between
themselves, 63 employees of T & K Steel, Inc.f who had labored
on the condominium project, had not been paid their wages.
the words of RDG:

In

"All amounts owed by RDG to T & K Steel,

Inc. under the contract were paid in full on or before December
7, 1984, the date the contract was terminated.

Unfortunately,

it appears that T & K Steel did not fully pay its employees for
wages earned on the condominium project."

(R. 80 lines 1-4).

These employees assigned their rights to the unpaid
wages to the Industrial Commission of Utah pursuant to Section
34-28-13, Utah Code 1985-1986, (R. 9 ) . The Industrial
Commission, in three separate orders, found RDG and T & K
Steel, Inc. jointly and severally liable for the unpaid wages
of the 63 employees totaling $22,401.33.

The Industrial

Commission found RDG liable under the provisions of Section
34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986, (R. 10). RDG filed a notice of
appeal and petition for trial de novo (R. 2-5). The Industrial
Commission filed an answer (R. 52) and admitted every
allegation contained in RDG's Petition For Trial De Novo with
the exception of paragraph 8, which alleged the Industrial
Commission erred when it found RDG liable under Section
34-28-8, Utah Code, 1985-1986.

The only additional facts that

were presented to the court were those contained in RDG's
Certificate of Limited Partnership (R. 86-94).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission respectfully submits that
the intent of the legislatures of 1937, 1941, and 1969, when
they enacted Section 34-28-8 and its earlier versions, was to
protect employees such as those employed by T & K Steel, Inc.
and working on RDG's condominiums at Deer Valley.

The purpose

of the entire Labor Code is to protect the laborer.

Chapter 28

of Title 34 contains several provisions which encourage the
prompt and complete payment of wages.

Among those provisions

is Section 8, it makes wages an obligation that goes beyond the
immediate employer and reaches the entity that benefits from
the laborers1 toil.
RDG did not require T & K Steel, Inc. to furnish a
payment bond.

RDG accepted the risk that T & K Steel, Inc.

would not be able to pay its employees their wages.

T & K

Steel failed to pay their employees and now RDG wants to shift
the loss associated with that risk to the employees.

But, the

loss should be born by the entity that assumed the risk, by the
entity that benefited from the laborers' efforts, by the entity
that stands to make a profit from the sale and operation of the
condominiums —

RDG.

RDG did not perfect its appeal by filing a cost bond
as required by Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P.

Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. makes

the provisions of Rule 73 U.R.C.P. applicable to appeals from
wage claim awards of the Industrial Commission.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE OWNER-DEVELOPER OF LAND, WHO
CONTRACTS WITH A BUILDER TO CONSTRUCT
AN IMPROVEMENT ON HIS LAND, IS LIABLE
FOR THE WAGES OF THE BUILDER'S
EMPLOYEES IF THE BUILDER DOES NOT PAY
THE WAGES.

This appeal is the first opportunity the Supreme Court
of Utah has had to determine the intent and purpose of Section
34-28-8, Utah Code 1985-1986.
stated:

The court has previously

"The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of

the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of
the Act.

The meaning of a part of an act should harmonize with

the purpose of the whole act."

Jensen v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903f 906 (Utah 1984).

The "plain

language" of Section 34-28-8 gives a laborer a cause of action
against the person who benefits from his labor in the event his
employer does not pay him his wages.
The facts in this case mirror the language* of Section
34-28-8;
Section 34-28-8:

Facts:

"Whenever any person
shall contract with
another for the
performance of work.,

"RDG entered into a
contract with T & K Steel,
Inc./ a Utah corporation,
wherein RDG agreed to pay
a sum certain to T & K
Steel, Inc. in return for
certain construction
services to be performed on
a parcel of real property
located in Summit County,
State of Utah."
(From RDG's Petition on
Appeal R.2, paragraph 2)

-6-

"... and in the event
that any wages earned
under the contract shall
not be paid as required
in this act..."

"Unfortunately, it appears
that T & K Steel, Inc. did
not fully pay its employees
for wages earned on the
condominium project."
(From RDG•s Memorandum
R. 80)

"... such person shall
be civilly liable for all
wages for work performed
under such contract in
the same manner as if the
employees entitled to
such wages were directly
employed by such person."
Under the circumstances presented by this appeal, the
"plain language" of this statute protects T & K Steel's
employees by giving them a cause of action against RDG.

The

statute is fair because RDG could have protected itself by
overseeing the payment of wages or requiring a payment bond
from T & K Steel, which it chose not to do.

See paragraph 38

(R. 35) of the contract between RDG and T & K Steel, Inc.

RDG

assumed the risk, it should assume the loss.
The only other state that has had a similar statute is
Kansas.

The Supreme Court of Kansas determined the intent and

purpose of its similar law, in a similar fact situation.

In

McGowen v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 215 Kan. 887,
529 P.2d 97 (1974) Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, a
public utility, needed some underground telephone cable
installed and entered into a contract with D & M Cable Company
to perform the service.

Just as in the case on appeal, before

the completion of the project the contract was terminated.

At

the time of the contract termination, wages were due employees
of D & M Cable Company who had worked on the project.
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The

employees made demand for their unpaid wages upon Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company based upon the following statute:
Whenever any such corporation shall
contract any or all of its work to any
contractor, then it shall become the
duty of such corporation to provide
that the employees of such corporation
or contractor shall be paid according
to the provisions of this act, and such
corporation shall become responsible
and liable to the employees of such
contractor in the same manner as if
said employees were employed by such
corporation* McGowen, at page 98.
At the trial court, each party filed a motion for
summary judgment.

The trial court determined that the

employees could not recover from Southwestern Bell Telephone.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the trial court
and found Southwestern Bell Telephone Company liable for the
wages of D & M Cable Company employees.
In an earlier case, Brewer v. Kansas Electric Power
Company, 148 Kan. 434, 83 P.2d 103 (1938), Kansas Electric
Power company operated a bus transportation system.

It entered

into a contract with Reeves and Callison, a partnership, for
the operation and maintenance of the buses.

Reeves and

Callison hired Brewer as a mechanic to repair the buses.
Brewer worked on the buses but was not paid his wages.

Brewer

brought an action against Kansas Electric Power Company under
the statute cited above:

G.S. 1935, 44-306.

The Supreme Court

of Kansas found Kansas Electric Power company liable for
Brewer's wages.
The same year that Brewer was working as a mechanic on
Kansas Electric & Power Company's buses, 1937, the Utah State
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Legislature enacted Section 49-9-10 (1939 Supplement to the
Utah Revised Statutes of 1933)/ which provided:
(a)

Whenever an employer shall contract
with another, herein called the
subcontractor, for the performance of
the employer's work, then it shall be
the duty of such an employer to provide
in such contract that the employees of
the subcontractor shall be paid
according to the provisions of this
act; and in the event that such
subcontractor shall fail to pay wages
to his employees as specified in this
act, such employer shall become civilly
liable to the employees of the
subcontractor to the extent that such
work is performed under such contract
in the same manner as if said employees
were directly employed by such employer.

(b)

The provisions of paragraph (a) of this
section shall likewise be deemed
applicable to any person, firm,
partnership, association or corporation
who not being an employer, and
hereinafter referred to in this act as
an "indirect employer," contracts with
a subcontractor for the performance of
his work. (Emphasis added).

The term "employer" was defined in Section 49-9-3(a):
Whenever used in this act, "employer"
includes every person, firm,
partnership, association, corporation,
receiver or other officer of a court of
this state, and any agent or officer of
any of the above mentioned classes,
employing any person in this state.
Section 49-9-10(b) extended liability beyond
"employer" to an "indirect employer"; thus, any person who
contracted with another person for work was liable for the
earned but unpaid wages of the second person's employees.
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In 1941, the legislature passed H.B. No. 86 which
amended Section 49-9-10(a) and (b) to read:
Whenever any person shall contract with
another for the performance of work, then it
shall be the duty of such person to provide
in such contract that all wages earned
pursuant to such contract shall be paid in
accordance with the provisions of this act,
and in the event that any wages earned under
such contract shall not be paid as required
in this act, such person shall be civilly
liable for all wages for work performed
under such contract in the same manner as if
the employees entitled to such wages were
directly employed by such person. Laws of
Utah 1941, Chapter 48, page 104. (Emphasis
added).
In this amendment the legislature did away with the
terms "employer" and "indirect employer" and substituted the
words "any person" and deleted the term "subcontractor".

The

amendments did not diminish the breadth of the statute nor its
plain intent.

With the exception that the word "act" was

changed to "chapter", the statute has remained the same since
1941.

There is no evidence to support the trial court's
finding that RDG was not a licensed contractor nor regularly
engaged in the construction business.

The district judge

modified the order (R.97-98) submitted by RDG's counsel by
handwriting the following finding:

"K.R. [Kenneth Rigtrup]

owners of property being developed, not a licensed contractor
or not regularly engaged in the construction business."

This

determination of the trial judge is completely without an
evidentiary basis.

This matter was presented to the trial
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judge on cross motions for summary judgment.

The parties did

not enter into a stipulation as to the facts, nor did either
party file supporting affidavits.

The only facts before the

court were those pled by RDG in its Petition for Trial De Novo
(R. 2-11) and admitted by the Industrial Commission in its
Answer (R. 52-53A); the contract between RDG and T & K Steel
referenced in paragraph 2 of RDG's Petition for Trial De Novo
(R. 3 ) ; and RDG's First Amended Certificate of Limited
Partnership which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit
(R. 86-94).
None of the admitted facts or exhibits contain any
evidence to support a finding that RDG was neither a "licensed
contractor" nor "regularly engaged in the construction
business".

RDG makes such assertions in an argument set forth

in a memorandum; but those allegations are not attested to and
could not have been used by the court.

For these reasons, the

handwritten findings of the court are in error.
II.

THE FILING OF THE COST BOND, AS SET
FORTH IN RULE 73(k) U.R.C.P., IS A
NECESSARY PART OF PERFECTING AN APPEAL
FROM AN ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION TO PAY WAGES.

RDG did not file a cost bond at the time it filed its
Notice of Appeal with the district court.

The Industrial

Commission asserted this failure as a defense in its Answer
(R. 52); and filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based upon
the failure of RDG to file the bond.
Rule 73, subsections (h)-(l), U.R.C.P. govern appeals
to district court.

Rule 81(d), U.R.C.P. makes those provisions
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applicable to appeals from orders of administrative agencies to
district court.

This has been firmly established in Utah

Chiropractic Association v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978), dealing with an appeal from the
insurance commission, and Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.
Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1979),
dealing with an appeal from the Utah Transportation Commission.
Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P. provides:
These Rules shall apply to the practice
and procedure in appealing from or
obtaining a review of any order, ruling
or other action of an administrative
board or agency, except in so far as
the specific statutory procedure in
connection with any such appeal or
review is in conflict or inconsistent
with these Rules. (Emphasis added).
The Amended Order For Payment (R. 9-11) is an "order"
of an "administrative board or agency" as those terms are used
in Rule 81(d).
Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P. states that an appellant to the
district court "shall" file "at the time of filing the notice
of appeal" a cost bond in the sum of $100.00.

It provides:

At the time of filing the notice of
appeal, the appellant shall file with
such notice a bond for costs on appecil
in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 73(c), except that the amount of
such bond shall be $100.00. The
appellant may likewise, under the
conditions of Rule 62 and in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 73,
relating to appeals to the Supreme
Court, obtain a stay of execution
pending an appeal, provided, that any
exception to th€> appellant's sureties
shall be made in the district court to
which the appeal is taken and
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justification of such sureties shall be
before the clerk or a judge of such
court. (Emphasis added).
The appeal was not perfected and, therefore, the
district court did not obtain jurisdiction of this matter.
CONCLUSION
Section 34-28-8, Utah Code, 1985-1986,
part of this state's law for nearly 50 years.
clear.

Its purpose is obvious.

has been a

Its language is

The district court erred when

it granted RDG a summary judgment.

The Industrial Commission

seeks a reversal of the district court's order granting RDG
summary judgment; an order granting the Industrial Commission's
motion for partial summary judgment; and a remand to the
district court for evidence regarding the amount of the wages
due and owing.
With regard to the cost bond, the Industrial
Commission seeks an order declaring that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because the cost bond
was not filed as required by Rule 73(k) U.R.C.P., or, in the
alternative, an order directing RDG to post such a bond on
remand.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3{^_

day of April, 1986.

deputy Sa^t Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Appellant,
Industrial Commission of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify thcit four copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief were served upon the below named party by
depositing the same, postage pre-paid, in the United States
mail service on the *2& "day of April, 1986, the party being:

Michael N. Emery, 0 990
Hansen, Jones, Maycock & Leta
Attorneys for Respondent, RDG
Suite 600, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utat/ 841Q
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

NOV 181985

Michael N. Emery, State Bar No. 0990
HANSEN JONES MAYCOCK <5c LETA
Attorneys for Appellants/Employers
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-7520

H. Dixon Hmaloy. Clerx ffi D'st. Court
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Ol/Q/t*irt*-&C'

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
RDG ASSOCIATES/
JORMAN CORPORATION,

ORDER DENYING
RESPONDENTS MOTION TO
DISMISS; DENYING
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; AND GRANTING
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellants/Employers,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
Respondent.

Civil N<*C85-84Sp
C85-1856farrd-eSr5-2327

(Consolidated)
(Judge Rigtrup)

ATKINSON, Eddy R., et al.,
Employees.
ooOoo

Respondent's Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment, and Appellants' Motion For Summary Judgment came on for hearing
before the court on October 28, 1985, at 2:00 p.m., the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup presiding. Appellants were represented by Michael N. Emery of Hansen
Jones Maycock & Leta, and Respondent was represented by Jay Stone of the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. The court having reviewed the pleadings
and papers on file herein, having heard the arguments and representations of
counsel, having received, by stipulation, a copy of petitioner's Certificate of
Limited Partnership which was marked as Exhibit 1 for purposes of all three
consolidated cases, and having found that there is no genuine issue as to any

CGGC97

material fact, and that Appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
2.

Respondent's Motion To Dismiss is denied;

2.

Respondents Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is denied;

3.

Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment is hereby granted and the

orders for payment with respect to Wage Claim Nos, 27301, 27361 and 27468,
issued by the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah on January 25,
March 8, and April 8, 1985, respectively, are reversed to the extent such orders
impose liability on RDG Associates and/or Jorman Corporation, fkiA&uAX **?'*- j C L ^ ^ ^ ' ^ " * ^
,„,"*"
A/
n^ *. *&*Z4«L r~foJ~TZsMADE AND ENTERED this (% -day of AvyewJfc*> fl985. ' T O - *^fc
»«*> t
BY THE COURT

MAILING CERTIFICATE

" </

I hereby certify that on this
/
day of November, 1985,1 caused to be
mailed, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true and complete copy of the
foregoing proposed Order to the following:
Jay Stone, Esq.
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office
231 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411

